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In this speech,  made shortly after the stock market 
crash of October 1987, President  Corrigan identifies 
imbalances in the U.S. and the world economy that 
contributed to financial market instability. He emphas- 
izes that the reduction of U.S. federal budget deficits 
and the removal of barriers to international trade are 
prerequisites for adjustment, and he ends by drawing 
some  implications for the supervision of financial 
markets. 
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Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen; it is a pleasure 
for me to have this opportunity to address the Cana- 
dian Club of Toronto. 
I think  you will all understand that this is not the eas- 
iest of times for a central banker to be making public 
appearances;  indeed, there is  an old adage that central 
bankers should be seen and not heard. In these turbu- 
lent days I am inclined to the view that we should be 
neither seen nor heard. Since that is not a practical 
alternative, the next best thing is to be careful  and 
measured in what we do and in what we say. Consis- 
tent with that, let me say right at the outset that I will 
have absolutely  nothing to say this afternoon about 
possible near-term changes in interest rates, exchange 
rates, or stock prices! However, I do want to take this 
opportunity to provide something of a broad overview 
of the economic challenges that lie ahead—with partic- 
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ular emphasis  on the adjustments  which  must take 
place over time if we are to succeed in restoring better 
balance in the U.S. and the world economy. 
Having said that, obviously I cannot ignore the recent 
period of unprecedented volatility in financial markets 
around the world. In the wake of these developments, 
there is a natural and  appropriate desire to better 
understand what  happened, why it happened, and what 
it implies for the future. I would not be so foolish to try 
to answer any of those questions at this time. I say that 
in  part because  meaningful answers will come only 
after the dust settles  and only with the benefit of the 
perspective that will come with the passage of time. 
However, it is important that we learn all we can about 
exactly what happened on Monday,  October 19, when 
the Dow fell  by 500 points, including the answers to 
such questions as whether programmed trading or 
highly leveraged positions in stock futures and options 
played an important role in unleashing those events or 
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tum developed. But to cite just one example of 
perspective, let us also keep in mind that stock prices 
in countries other than the United States where those 
particular institutional arrangements  are far less impor- 
tant than they are in the United States have fallen by 
even greater amounts than the drop in the United 
States. 
Let us also keep in mind that when we look carefully 
at the period between  late August,  when the Dow 
peaked at about 2700, and mid-October,  when the Dow 
had reached its recent low of just above 1700, it is not 
easy to conclude that there was any one event or even 
any combination of events that can satisfactorily 
explain all that has happened over that interval. To be 
sure, from a U.S. perspective the dollar was  under 
pressure in the exchange markets; interest rates, espe- 
cially  long-term rates, had risen; inflationary expecta- 
tions were building; and there were signs of strains in 
the process of international economic policy coordina- 
tion.  While these developments were disturbing,  indi- 
vidually or collectively, it is not clear that they should 
have been decisive, especially  since over this same 
period economic performance was, in several crucial 
respects, better than  earlier expectations.  The U.S. 
budget deficit,  for fiscal 1987 turned out to be smaller 
than even the most optimistic  expectations;  spurred 
importantly by growth in exports, economic activity in 
the United States—including  in the manufacturing 
sector—was stronger than expected; growth prospects 
abroad were no worse than earlier  and, in the case  of 
Japan, were actually better; and developments on the 
inflation front—while warranting careful and continuing 
vigilance—were in no way indicative of a significant 
outburst of inflation. 
In short, as hard as we may look, it is by no means 
clear to me that we will find in these recent weeks a 
smoking gun or  guns that can explain why stock prices 
plummeted so sharply and so abruptly  in the United 
States and around the world. Let us also not lose sight 
of the fact that stock prices in the United States and 
elsewhere had reached historic heights in both abso- 
lute and  relative terms in this general time frame. 
Indeed, the rise in stock prices during 1987 was such 
that even now stock  prices in the United States are 
above their year-end 1986 levels. 
Imbalances In the U.S. and the world economy 
What I am suggesting, or course, is that the underlying 
causes of the recent financial market disturbances are 
not to be found in the events of the past several weeks 
or months but rather in the cumulative weight of events 
over a much longer time frame. Looked at in that light,  it seems to me that the important conclusion to be 
drawn from recent experience is that the financial mar- 
kets are sending us a message,  and that message is in 
the form  of a warning that despite a long period of 
satisfactory, if not quite extraordinary, economic perfor- 
mance, there  are  serious imbalances  in  the United 
States and world economy that simply must be 
remedied and remedied without further delay. Indeed, 
to the extent recent market developments have been 
fueled by any one thing, that thing may have been a 
growing  doubt as to whether the policy process— 
domestically and internationally—was capable of 
mounting the necessary policy initiatives to deal with a 
series of problems which were certainly not new. 
While the nature of these problems is not new, allow 
me as a matter of emphasis to cite several examples  of 
things that from a U.S. perspective lie at the heart of 
our difficulties: 
• In the late 1970s, general government budget defi- 
cits in the United States consumed, on average, 
only about 10 percent of our net private domestic 
savings. By 1986,  and despite large surpluses in 
state and  local  governments, overall government 
deficits were consuming almost two-thirds of net 
private domestic savings, with  the  federal deficit 
eating up an astonishing 90 percent of net private 
savings.  While  these figures have come down 
somewhat  this  year, they remain  far, far too high by 
any reasonable standard.  •  As recently as 1981, the United  States was the 
world's largest net creditor nation. We are now its 
largest net debtor and sometime in 1988 our net 
external indebtedness will  cross the $500 billion 
threshold. To put it differently, by the end of 1988 
our net external indebtedness  will reach or exceed 
the accumulated public debt of the United States 
from its inception through 1974.  •  Since the last quarter of 1983, nonfinancial corpo- 
rate America has retired a cumulative total of $270 
billion in equity while over the same interval corpo- 
rate debt has increased  by a staggering $600 
billion.  •  On a global basis, the U.S. trade and current 
account deficits, and their mirror-image surpluses 
in  several of our major trading  partners,  are of 
unsustainable proportions. 
These examples reflect the harsh reality  'that for too 
long we  in the United  States  have been borrowing 
more than we save and consuming more than we pro- 
duce  in an environment in which debt, deficits,  and 
leveraging have become a way of life for government, 
for business, and for individuals. Fortunately, we have 
both the underlying economic strength and the oppor- 
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the warnings of the  recent past and get on with the 
task now. 
Yet, as we approach that task we must be realistic. 
There are no quick fixes; for example, we in the United 
States must  recognize that for a period of time our 
standard of living must rise at a slower rate than would 
otherwise be the case. We must also be realistic in our 
expectations; for example, we can all look back with 
fondness at the interest rate environment of the 1950s 
and early 1960s and wish that we could quickly and 
easily return to such a tranquil  setting. The reality, 
however, is that no country with our recent track record 
of debt, deficits,  and inflation should expect such a 
result to emerge quickly or  painlessly. Finally, let us 
also remain mindful of the risks and dangers on all 
sides.  For example, there can be no doubt  that the 
exchange rate is a crucially important variable in the 
current setting, but just as there are dangers with an 
exchange rate that is too high, there are dangers with 
one that is too low. Indeed, at the end of the day, there 
is no exchange rate which, unto itself, can solve our 
current problems in an orderly way. 
Policy Initiatives 
All of that is simply a long-winded way of saying that 
imbalances in the U.S. economy are an important con- 
tributing force to the imbalances we see in the world 
economy. But the existence of these problems in the 
U.S. economy  does not mean that the burden of adjust- 
ment lies exclusively with the United  States. To the 
contrary, any realistic appraisal of the current situation 
must recognize that directly or indirectly the rest of the 
world has been the beneficiary of the U.S. trade deficit 
as output, employment, and income growth elsewhere 
have been  supported by consumption in the United 
States. In other words, adjustment in the United States 
of necessity implies adjustment elsewhere and espe- 
cially in the large surplus countries. There is no mys- 
tery to that.  Nor is there any mystery in the kinds of 
policy initiatives that are needed to produce the neces- 
sary adjustments.  Those essential policy initiatives 
including the following: 
• We in the United States must sharply reduce and, 
in a relatively short period of time, eliminate our 
domestic savings gap. That domestic savings gap 
is the difference, relative to GNP, between our net 
domestic savings and the claims on those savings 
stemming from the combination of financing private 
investment and financing the government's  deficits. 
In recent quarters, that savings gap has been aver- 
aging well in excess of $100 billion, or more than 
3 percent of GNP. Looked at in that light, the prob- 
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lem with the U.S. budget deficit is not so much its 
size relative to GNP but rather its size relative to 
domestic savings. 
However,  there are only three ways our savings 
gap can be eliminated: first,  by reducing private 
investment which, if anything, is already too low; 
second, by increasing net domestic savings which, 
while desirable over time, simply does not seem to 
be in the cards in  sufficient time or amounts to 
produce the needed result in an orderly way; and 
third,  by reducing the financing needs of the 
government. 
As a practical matter, cutting the budget deficit is 
the only real choice we have, and even that is not 
really a choice but is rather a question of whether 
this generation pays the freight  for failing to act or 
whether we will pass that burden on to future gen- 
erations. The equivalent of a macroeconomic  free 
lunch,  like other  free lunches, simply  does  not 
exist. 
One silver lining behind the cloud of recent mar- 
ket developments appears to be an  encouraging 
and bipartisan willingness on the part of the politi- 
cal leadership  in  the United  States to mount  a 
fresh and vigorous attack on the budget deficit. To 
the extent that effort can produce a credible pro- 
gram of deficit reduction which, as an illustration, 
could roughly eliminate the domestic savings gap 
in  an intermediate time frame, the consequences 
for markets and for the economic outlook should 
be constructive.  •  We in the United States must also accept, for a 
period of time, a slower rise in our standard of liv- 
ing than would otherwise be the case. By that  I 
mean,  of course, that the rate at which the  U.S. 
economy consumes goods and services must slow 
in absolute terms and in relation to GNP. To put it 
in slightly different terms, if real GNP growth were 
to average 3 percent over the next several  years— 
a result I would consider  quite satisfactory—the 
only way net exports can rise is if domestic 
demand is growing  at a slower  rate than  GNP 
itself. 
It would be nice to think we could have a suffi- 
ciently high growth in GNP to accommodate  both a 
rise in net exports and a rate of  growth in domestic 
demand commensurate with historical experience. 
Unfortunately, it is most unlikely that such a result 
could emerge without running grave and, in my 
judgment, wholly unacceptable, risks of renewed 
inflationary momentum. Indeed, when one takes 
account of the fact that the  bulk of the external 
adjustment in the U.S. trade deficit must come via 
higher exports and lower imports of manufactured 
— goods, there are inflationary risks inherent in even 
the most optimal pattern of adjustment.  • Adjustment in  the  United States is crucial  but  it 
must be supported  by complementary  develop- 
ments in other countries, especially in those indus- 
trialized and  newly  industrialized  countries  that 
have large trade and  payment surpluses.  That 
requires that those countries must go through a 
period in which their domestic demand increases 
faster than their GNPs even as GNP growth rates 
are maintained at otherwise satisfactory rates. To 
some extent, the  process is already taking  hold, 
especially in Japan. However, without singling out 
any one country, a question naturally arises as to 
whether this process could not be further strength- 
ened by additional stimulus—especially  on the fis- 
cal side. Indeed, in a context in which fiscal 
stimulus is being reduced in the United States, the 
case for some increased fiscal stimulus elsewhere 
has natural  appeal. This is  especially  so since 
there are ways in which temporary moves on the 
fiscal side—which need not jeopardize longer term 
objectives of budget discipline and price stability— 
can be very helpful in the transition to more bal- 
anced growth in the world economy.  •  The other remaining  major  link in this chain  of 
needed policy initiatives is in the area of trade pol- 
icy. Protectionism is simply not the answer to our 
economic woes.  History tells us that in a blunt 
fashion. But just as we must strongly resist  protec- 
tionist pressures in the United States, other  coun- 
tries must  move  decisively  in  opening their 
markets to imports, including imports from the 
United States. The recent dramatic gains in pro- 
ductivity in the U.S. manufacturing sector and the 
not unrelated surge  in  U.S. exports  of manufac- 
tured goods suggest that U.S. firms can compete 
in world markets, especially in a setting in which 
artificial barriers to imports are being  reduced 
around the world. 
A more open and market-driven  world trading 
system is what  we want  and what  we need. In that 
regard, the bilateral efforts between Canada and 
the United States to adopt a major liberalization of 
trading arrangements between our two  countries 
can serve as a model to the rest of the world.  I 
recognize, •of course,  that final adoption of that 
trade pact faces obstacles on both sides, but I sin- 
cerely hope we can quickly get on with the process 
of ratification, not just because it would be benefi- 
cial to both our countries but also because of the 
message it sends to the rest of the world. 
To summarize, the nature of the  imbalances in the 
United States and the world  economy is well known. 
More importantly,  there now seems  to be a widening con- 
sensus in the United States and elsewhere as to the 
kinds of policy initiatives that can remedy these imbal- 
ances in an orderly way. To the extent that assessment  is 
accurate—and  I certainly believe it is—the prospects  for 
the world economy are brighter indeed. However,  the 
clock is also ticking; delay and procrastination  in getting 
on with the execution of  the  necessary  policies carry with 
them the clear and present danger of slippage in both 
economic performance  and prospects.  The  benefits from 
cooperative and concerted actions are clear, but so too 
are the costs of inaction. 
Structure and behavior of financial markets 
At the risk of exhausting your patience, allow me to 
close with a few remarks  about  the implications of 
recent events for the structure  and behavior of our 
financial markets and institutions. It is possible to look 
at the recent period of turmoil in financial markets and 
observe that those markets and institutions performed 
remarkably well under enormous strain. In one sense 
that is obviously true.  But however true it may be,  I 
think it would be a serious mistake to have passed 
through this episode and not to have learned from it. In 
that regard, let me briefly mention a couple of things 
that stand out in my mind: 
• First, the financial wizardry that has been so much 
in vogue in recent years carries with  it new and 
often very complex elements of risk to market par- 
ticipants and institutions alike. Long periods of bull 
markets tend to bring about a subtle but certain 
relaxation of standards of caution and prudence if 
not a tendency, at least for a  few, to allow  greed to 
be substituted for common  sense. When those ten- 
dencies are coupled with technologically-driven 
innovations in the financial marketplace that dra- 
matically  increase the speed, volume, and com- 
plexity of transactions, new elements of risk and 
volatility can come into play.  • Efforts  aimed at reform of national banking and 
financial market systems—such  as those well 
under way here  in Canada—should not be post- 
poned or delayed. The  case for progressive reform 
is still there but so too is the case  for insisting that 
the process of reform be accompanied by appro- 
priately strong supervisory arrangements.  • The  global character of financial markets has been 
a reality for some time.  But it seems to me that 
recent events have demonstrated just how closely 
intertwined those markets have become. That  real- 
ity carries  with it the clear and pressing need to 
achieve a much higher degree of harmony among 
nations with regard to the supervision of banking 
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the G-1O central banks are well  advanced in efforts 
to arrive  at a common multilateral  approach to 
bank capital adequacy standards for internationally 
active banking organizations. Hopefully, that effort 
can be completed in the near term since it would 
constitute a very important step forward in interna- 
tional cooperation that would make sense both on 
competitive and prudential grounds. But as impor- 
tant as it is, it is only a beginning in the larger task 
of seeking to adapt national standards of banking 
and capital  market practices  and supervision  to 
what  are clearly international markets. 
To summarize, the current economic and financial sit- 
uation  in the United  States and  around  the world 
should be a matter of concern to all of us. But our fate 
is in our own hands. We have the tools, the knowledge, 
and the underlying  strength to forge the necessary 
adjustments that can permit a return to a more bal- 
anced  and sustainable  pattern of economic  perfor- 
mance.  That opportunity has not been lost; to the 
contrary, recent events may well have worked in the 
direction of enhancing prospects that the needed pol- 
icy initiatives—nationally  and internationally—will  be 
forthcoming. Indeed, even before recent  market devel- 
opments, important initial elements of that transition 
were beginning to take hold. Building on those develop- 
ments and with a renewed sense of purpose, I believe 
we can seize this opportunity and cooperatively man- 
age our way through this transition in a manner that 
will yield a more secure and more stable future for all. 
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